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REFORM is a word that, one might easily say, characterizes more than any other the history and development of Buddhism. One can see the impulse 
for reform as far back as the Second Council at Vaishali, held barely a cen­
tury after the death of Siddhartha Gautama, which led to the split between the 
Elders (Sthaviravadin) and the Great Order (Mahasanghika), thus setting in 
motion the wheel of Buddhist sectarianism. It is certainly true that since 
Buddhism first “officially” arrived on the shores of Kyushu in the 6th century 
CE via the Paekche Kingdom of Korea, the imperative to develop and restruc­
ture Buddhism to suit contemporary needs has been a defining motif within 
Japanese Buddhism. Gyogi frJE (668-749), Saicho (767-822), Kukai S 
W, Honen ?£&$, Dogen 3M7E, Shinran Nichiren H and Ingen ®7E may 
all be considered as part of this general wave. Although this paper, along with 
others in this volume, is concerned with specifically modem movements 
towards Buddhist reform in Japan, it is important to bear in mind that one 
could construct a long genealogy behind such movements. Yet, it must also 
be said that reform movements in East Asian Buddhism have often taken on 
another goal—harmony or unification', that is, a desire not only to reconstruct 
a more worthy form of Buddhism, but to simultaneously bring together all
* This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the XIXth World Congress of the Inter­
national Association for the History of Religions, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2005.
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existing forms under a single banner, in theory if not in practice. Like the drive 
for reform, this urge to merge also has long precedents in Japan, dating back 
as far as Jushichijo kenpo (Seventeen Article Constitution) by
Shotoku Taishi in which the various emergent streams of Sino-
Japanese culture are quite consciously fused together as one, amid the expos­
tulation to “consider harmony as the most valuable.”2 3 This paper explores 
some of the tensions between the desire for reform and the quest for harmo­
ny in modem Japanese Buddhist thought, by comparing two developments: 
the late nineteenth-century movement towards “New Buddhism” {shin 
bukkyd as exemplified by Murakami Sensho (1851-1929),
2 Proclaimed in 604 CE.
3 Ichi ni iwaku, yawaragu o motte tdtoshi to shi, sakaurukoto naki o mime to seyo —tH 
<L SKWSUL
4 It has recently been brought to my attention that the two instigators of Critical Buddhism
and the late twentieth-century movement known as “Critical Buddhism” 
(hihan bukkyd fttWAIfc), as found in the works of Matsumoto Shiro and 
Hakamaya Noriaki.
Critical Buddhism
In the mid to late 1980s, Matsumoto and Hakamaya, two Soto Zen school 
scholars at Komazawa University, launched a short-lived but controversial 
scholarly campaign in the name of something they called hihan bukkyd— 
Critical Buddhism. The ferment reached a peak in the early 1990s, with the 
publication of Hakamaya’s Hongaku shiso hihan (Critiques of
the Doctrine of Original Enlightenment, 1989), Hihan bukkyd (Critical Bud­
dhism, 1990), Dogen to bukkyd Il7ct-(A^ (Dogen and Buddhism, 1992), and 
Matsumoto’s Engi to ku: Nyoraizo shiso hihan SULiL’: 
(Pratltya-samutpada and Emptiness: Critiques of the Doctrine of Tathdgata- 
garbha, 1989) and Zen shiso no hihanteki kenkyii (Critical
Studies on Zen Thought, 1994), followed by a session at the American 
Academy of Religion’s 1993 meeting in Washington, D.C., entitled “Critical 
Buddhism: Issues and Responses to a New Methodological Movement,” out 
of which emerged the English-language collection of essays, Pruning the 
Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism (Hubbard and Swanson 1994). 
As with all storms, this one, we might say, eventually passed the critical stage, 
to the extent that for many scholars Critical Buddhism is now something of a 
dead horse.4 Yet there are a number of important lessons to be learned from 
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Critical Buddhism, not least with respect to the often competing drives to­
wards Buddhist reform and unification.5
The main arguments of Critical Buddhism can be briefly summarized as 
follows: (1) for over 1500 years, the Mahayana streams in general, and mod­
em Japanese offshoots in particular, have verged further and further off course 
from the true path of Buddhism, which is based on core doctrines like pratitya- 
samutpada and has a decidedly critical, rational, and humanistic intent; (2) 
the causes of this degeneration, though many, can be located especially in the 
development of doctrines tending towards essentialism or what is called “top­
ical Buddhism”—for example, tathagata-garbha (Jp. nyoraizd 
Suchness (Jp. shinnyo K#D), Buddha-nature (Jp. busshd JAtt) and original 
enlightenment thought (Jp. hongaku shiso (3) finally and most cru­
cially, the broad acceptance of such quasi-essentialist doctrines have led inex­
orably to the emergence of forms of Buddhism that lack all critical, rational, 
discriminatory elements, and that, correspondingly, are bereft of a strong 
foundation for Buddhist ethics and social justice in the modern world. Thus, 
Matsumoto and Hakamaya were pushing above all for fundamental reform 
of Buddhist doctrine and practice. Unlike previous reformers, however, they 
were not interested in bringing unity or harmony to the various Buddhist 
schools, but rather in clearly distinguishing the core doctrines and values of 
True or Critical Buddhism from False or Topical Buddhism—even if such 
means, as they thought it would, pruning a great part of the Bodhi tree.
In all that has been written about Critical Buddhism, in both Japanese and 
English, very little attention has been paid to the place of the movement within
have since had a rather acrimonious, public falling-out. Matsumoto, in particular, has chosen 
to distance himself and his work from the tasks of his erstwhile collaborator.
5 I will not here go into the many-sided arguments of Critical Buddhism, but it should be 
noted that the “movement,” though largely based on the work of only two scholars, caused 
much debate and even backlash within the Japanese Buddhist community. One reason for this 
was the forthright, combative style employed by both scholars, though one might say 
Hakamaya in particular, a form which is particularly foreign to traditional Japanese scholarship. 
But another was the simple fact that Critical Buddhism challenged many of the shibboleths of 
East Asian Mahayana—the Zen schools in particular. Called everything from fundamentalist, 
neo-conservative, liberal, Westernized, and even “non-Buddhist,” Matsumoto and Hakamaya 
have generally stood their ground against counter-attacks. In this paper, while speaking about 
Critical Buddhism as a whole, I will concentrate in particular on the work of Matsumoto, who 
is both more consistent and concise in his argumentation than the broader-ranging Hakamaya 
(see Sueki 1997, p. 321).
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the larger traditions of Japanese Buddhist reform.6 Thus, I would like in what 
follows to reconsider Critical Buddhism in relation to the concerns of the pre­
vious, much larger trends towards Buddhist reform that emerged almost 
exactly 100 years previous—the so-called shin bukkyd or New Buddhism of 
the late Meiji era. Shin bukkyd is a catch-all term that includes the various 
writings and activities of Inoue Enryo (1858-1919),7 Shaku Soen
(1859-1919),8 and Kiyozawa Manshi (1863-1903),9 as well as
the so-called Daijo hibussetsuron a broad term used (often
6 Dan Lusthaus (1997) alludes to the historical “inevitability” as well as the “necessity” of 
Critical Buddhism. Lusthaus is one of the few scholars to engage Critical Buddhism from a 
historical rather than purely buddhological or philological perspective, raising the possibility 
that the arguments of Critical Buddhism may be the recurrence of “an intrinsic Buddhist 
debate.” Still, Lusthaus is concerned mainly with ancient Buddhist debates from India and 
China, not with more modem ones within Japan.
7 Inoue, perhaps the most influential of all these Buddhist reformers, published his Bukkyd 
katsuron joron (ASiSfwJff™ (Introduction to the Revitalization of Buddhism) in 1887. Like 
Shaku Soen and the delegates to the 1893 Columbian Exposition, and against the so-called 
Daijo hibusseturon, Inoue combined a strong sense of Japanese nationalism and a faith in the 
universal message of (Mahayana) Buddhism with a commitment to presenting Buddhism as 
the most modem and “scientific” of all the world’s religions (see Staggs 1979, Snodgrass 
1998).
8 Shaku Soen, Rinzai Zen master, abbot of Engakuji Fl TO in Kamakura and teacher of D. 
T. Suzuki, led the Japanese delegation at the first World’s Parliament of Religions held at the 
Columbian Exhibition in Chicago, 1893 (see Snodgrass 1998, Snodgrass 2003). Soen, who 
advocated Buddhist unity—in his collaborative multivolume project, Essentials of Buddhist 
Teachings—as well as hegemony—he proclaimed Japanese Mahayana the “universal” reli­
gion of the modem world—is targeted by Brian Victoria (1997, pp. 25-29, 59-60, 98-99, 
109-10) for his complicity in the early development of “Imperial Way Zen” in Japan.
9 Kiyozawa was a central figure in the Higashi Honganji (Shin) school reform movement
(Higashi Honganji kaikaku undo of the 1890s. More than the other figures
mentioned here, but akin to thinkers of the later Kyoto School (Kyoto gaku-ha ^?JR), 
Kiyozawa was interested not simply in Buddhism but in coming to understand religion in a 
deeper and more general, existential sense. Like Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945),
Tanabe Hajime ES IZLtc (1885-1962), and Nishitani Keiji Fiji's (1900-1990) after him, he 
would come to understand the core of Buddhism (and religion) in terms of a kind of trans­
formative or ‘pure’ experience. His Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion, distributed at the 
Columbian Exposition in 1893, explains the core of religion as being, “more than just the activ­
ity of the infinite power, it is the process by which the finite becomes the infinite. Of this side 
of the finite, we might say that it is the way that the finite reaches out towards the infinite. 
Moreover, among the innumerable forms of the finite, it is through our individual souls, or we 
might say the evolution of consciousness, that we attain to the infinite—this is the essence of 
religion” (Kiyozawa 2002 p. 141).
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critically) to describe Buddhist writers who suggested that Mahayana 
Buddhism is not, in fact, the Buddhism taught by the “historical” Buddha 
Sakyamuni. Of these, I will make a few general remarks about Daijd 
hibussetsuron, before turning attention more specifically to the work of 
Murakami Sensho, in order to flesh out some of the similarities and differ­
ences between his attempt to construct a “unified Buddhism” and the work 
of his late twentieth-century avatars, the Critical Buddhists. Though a number 
of their aims and ideas overlap, I will argue that there remain fundamental 
differences with respect to the ultimate purposes of Buddhist reform. This 
issue hinges on the implications of key terms such as “unity” and “harmony” 
as well as the way doctrinal history is categorized and understood, but it also 
relates to issues of ideology and the use and abuse of Buddhist doctrines in 
twentieth-century politics.
Daijo Hibussetsuron
As Western culture and values, including models and methods of Western 
scholarship on religion, began to make themselves felt in the mid to late Meiji 
period, it was inevitable that such would lead some Buddhist scholars towards 
a demythologized,10 rational, ethical and historicist understanding of Bud­
dhism. Though it can hardly be considered a school or movement in its own 
right, theories of scholars who adopted such tendencies came to be known, 
often derisively, as Daijd hibussetsuron, which may be literally translated as 
the “theory that the Mahayana teachings are not true Buddhism.” The term 
was applied to the writings of several Buddhist scholars beginning in the 
1890s such as Murakami and Anesaki Masaharu (1873-1949), the
10 This drive towards demythologization of a religious tradition finds a parallel in Western 
scholarship on religion of the same period, particularly the drive towards uncovering the “his­
torical Jesus,” as well as the slightly later work of German theologian Rudolf Bultmann. As 
with such Western Christian scholars, the scholars of Daijd hibussetsuron were generally work­
ing to preserve some pure essence of their tradition by opening the gates to historical critical 
method, in the sincere belief that science could provide religious answers that mythology and 
even centuries of doctrinal development could not. It is important to note the fact that, in both 
cases, there was a distinct “theological” undercurrent at work.
latter of whom would eventually, and perhaps not incidentally, be appointed 
as first professor of Religious Studies at Tokyo Imperial University in 1905. 
Inspired by Western scholarly notions of empiricism and scientific method, 
Daijd hibussetsuron sought to clarify and demarcate the limits of what should 
be included under the rubric “Buddhism.” The conclusion was that the so- 
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called Great Vehicle was a repository for supematuralism, mysticism, defor­
mities or corruptions of the original, pure teachings, better preserved in the 
“Hmayana” and latter-day Theravada streams of Southeast Asia. Controversy 
of course ensued, most of the criticism coming, unsurprisingly, from the Bud­
dhist establishment, those still powerful institutions understandably reluctant 
to serve up their long-standing beliefs on the altar of “modem” (and Western- 
inspired) sensibilities.
It should also be recalled that this was only a few scant years after the brief 
but brutal state-sponsored persecution of Buddhism under the slogan haibutsu 
kishaku —lit. “Throw away Buddha and abolish Sakyamuni!”
Though the program of disestablishment was soon reversed, it was to leave 
an important imprint on late nineteenth-century Buddhism. Inoue’s plea for 
“revitalization,” Murakami’s desire for “unity,” and the more general Daijd 
hibussetsuron quest for a rational, true Buddhism—in short, virtually all the 
permutations of shin bukkyd—can be traced back to the after-effects of 
haibutsu kishaku.11 It is also important to note that the reaction to Daijd 
hibussetsuron cannot be separated from the fact that the most well-known 
precedent for Daijd hibussetsuron within Japan does not come from one of 
the Meiji scholars influenced by Western thought but rather from the contro­
versial writings of an Edo-period scholar by the name of Tominaga Nakamoto 
'szk'ft1® (1715-46). Tominaga may well have been the first writer “system­
atically to question the assumption that the Mahayana sutras, or indeed others, 
were transmitted directly from the [historical] Buddha.”12 Moreover, without, 
once again, the benefit of “Western learning,” Tominaga came to this con­
clusion by “the critical, historical method of juxtaposing innumerable varia­
tions in the various texts and illustrating how these arose in order for some 
point to be made over against another school.”13 Tominaga’s work raised a 
strong challenge to the claims to authority of the various Mahayana schools, 
11 “ ‘Shin Buddhism’ was shaped by the imperatives of the institutional, social, and politi­
cal crises of the early Meiji period, and the need to produce an interpretation of Buddhism 
appropriate to the new society. By the early 1890s, this Buddhism was further determined by 
the links between Buddhist revival and emerging nationalism” (Snodgrass 1998, p. 325).
12 Perhaps not incidentally, Tominaga may have also been the first scholar in Japan to employ 
the term shiikyo Ji® in a sense that approximates its modem usage (Pye 1990, p. 122). As Ian 
Reader (2004, p. 9) has pointed out, this flies in the face of the assumptions of scholars such 
as Tim Fitzgerald, who insist that the concept of “religion” is a cultural borrowing (or impo­
sition) from the West.
13 Pye 1990, p. 5.
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a challenge hardly mitigated by the aggressive and sometimes derisive tone 
he took towards those who “vainly say that all the teachings came directly 
from the golden mouth of the Buddha.”14 The point in raising this earlier 
example of Daijo hibussetsuron is to show that there was an understandable 
assumption of those who were faced with these types of historical arguments 
to see them as a direct challenge to not only the truth of certain Mahayana 
teachings but to the institutional authority of the Mahayana schools. Even 
scholars today tend to read the work of Murakami in light of this more extreme 
version of historicism, despite the fact that he rarely, if ever, went to the 
extremes of Tominaga or his own shin bukkyd contemporary Takada Doken 
SiEEfilM (1858—1923).15 As I want to show in the following, this is a mistake. 
Although the very term Daijd hibussetsuron carries normative baggage—i.e., 
a sharp criticism of Mahayana traditions as being ‘deviations’ from the true 
Buddhism taught by Sakyamuni—this normative addendum does not apply 
to the mature work of Murakami.
14 Ibid., p. 4.
15 Takada, though also an advocate of non-sectarian “unification,” developed a far stricter 
line against “superstition” (meishin I&11S) within the Mahayana. See LoBreglio’s article in this 
issue, in which he notes, quite rightly, that Takada may be considered an early twentieth-cen­
tury prophet of Critical Buddhism.
16 Sueki (1993) clearly outlines the main failings of Murakami’s scholarship, not least of 
which are his complete lack of Sanskrit and dismissal of Western scholarly conclusions on 
Buddhism.
17 As Murakami himself, by the time of writing the final volume, Jissenron (1927),
came to acknowledge: “At the time of its first publication, theoretically and also practically, 
there was a possibility of Buddhist unity, as well as the thought that such was necessary.” 
However, after this time, he could not help but acknowledge that while, “the theoretical pos­
sibility remained, the practical possibility did not.” This seems to contradict or at least prob- 
lematize his earlier admission that the unification he sought was not to be taken at the “formal” 
level. In any case, Sueki argues, correctly, I think, that the failure of Bukkyd toitsuron has as
On Bukkyd toitsuron
In his magnum opus, Bukkyd toitsuron iw (On the Unification of
Buddhism), Murakami attempted to employ the tools of modem critical schol­
arship to discern a clear historical and doctrinal foundation for Buddhism. 
The result is at once an original, impressive, yet deeply flawed piece of 
Buddhist scholarship—a “gorgeous failure”16 whose grand aspiration to 
bring about a “scheme for the amalgamation of all Buddhist sects” was bound 
to end in disappointment.17 Written in fits and starts over a period of more 
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than twenty years,18 its argument is, on the face of it, deceptively simple: 
Buddhism can and should be unified, because, whether Buddhists themselves 
recognize it or not, underlying all the manifold teachings (kyoso is a 
common, fundamental core or essence of doctrine (kyori WS), which pro­
vides not only the historical trunk but also the life-giving sap of the great 
Buddhist tree.19 Although he admits that unification at the “formal level” may 
not be possible, unification at the “ideal level” is not only possible and nec­
essary but has historical precedent in the harmonizing work of Saicho, founder 
of the Tendai school in Japan.20
In reading Bukkyd tditsuron, one thing becomes immediately obvious: 
although Murakami was a self-consciously modem scholar ostensibly dedi­
cated to rigorous historical scholarship, he was not so quick to follow the path 
of complete demythologization—he clearly states his commitment to uncov­
ering not only the bare facts of Buddhist history, but also to the more elusive 
religious or doctrinal dimensions that bind Buddhists of all stripes together. 
In other words, Murakami employs what he refers to elsewhere as a “Bud­
dhistic” (bukkydshugi approach to history, whereby the faith dimen­
sion retains a central place. This is a point where there appears to be a glaring 
difference between the methods of Murakami and Critical Buddhism, which 
is famous for Hakamaya’s pithy conclusion that “only criticism is Bud­
dhism”—in other words, that the truth of Buddhism can be found only through
much if not more to do with inherent problems in Murakami’s approach as it does with chang­
ing social and religious circumstances (Sueki 2004, p. 101).
18 Successive volumes were published in 1901, 1903, 1905 and 1927 (see Sueki and Mohr 
in this issue).
19 Murakami 1997, p. 10. Murakami’s use of kyoso, is of course related to the traditional, 
particularly Mahayana Buddhist teaching of upaya-kausalya (Jp. hdben Affi)—expedient 
means or “beneficent deception”—used especially by Chinese Buddhists “to help deal with 
the hermeneutical problem of reconciling the disparities among the different teachings attrib­
uted to the Buddha—to explain that the differences in the teachings of the Buddha delivered 
in his forty-nine-year ministry were the result of the different audiences he addressed” (Charles 
Muller, Digital Dictionary of Buddhism [hereafter DDB], s.v. “upaya-kausalya”').
20 Ibid., pp. 178-82. By contrast, Murakami has little to say of Saicho’s peer and rival, Kukai, 
founder of the esoteric Shingon school. Perhaps this has to do with Kukai’s more openly super- 
cessionist approach to rival schools, including Saichd’s Tendai (see note 25). Kukai appears 
to have found Saichd’s all-embracing pluralism insufficient for Buddhist “reform,” as did the 
various Kamakura-era founders (Honen, Eisai ffi, Shinran, Dogen, Ippen —iff), all of whom 
emerged from Tendai to establish their own schools, each adhering to a pared down vision of 
the best means to awakening.
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(and within) rational, critical, processes of analysis and empirical discrimi­
nation. Yet, looking beyond the CB rhetoric of rationalism and concomitant 
affection for the work of Rene Descartes, we see that in fact both Matsumoto 
and Hakamaya admit that there is a core of fundamental doctrines to which 
all Buddhists must adhere—a ground or bedrock that cannot be further 
reduced. To take the best example, and one I will return to later on, the twelve­
link chain of equiprimordiality,21 the single most basic and important 
Buddhist doctrine according to Critical Buddhism, is one that, while it may 
be rationally understood to a certain degree, must ultimately be accepted on 
what amounts to unwavering faith. Murakami also placespratitya-samutpada 
among the veiy core teachings of Buddhism in all its forms, and remarks, in 
a very similar fashion, that while faith should not be completely irrational, it 
does and must come into play: “As a rule,” he states,
21 Pratitya-samutpada is variously rendered in English as “co-dependent arising,” “depen­
dent origination,” or other pennutations of such, none of which sufficiently conveys the 
nuances of this important term (though “equiprimordiality” perhaps comes closer than those 
listed above). Given the continuing debates concerning a precise English translation of 
pratitya-samutpada, I have chosen to leave it in the Sanskrit, which is the most familiar read­
ing for buddhologists (though Hakamaya seems to prefer the Pali paticca-samuppada-, see, 
e.g., Hakamaya 1990, p. 16). At any rate, the Japanese engi similarly fails to convey the 
full Indian meaning, particularly as the word has come to mean, in ordinary Japanese, some­
thing like the English “omen.”
22 Murakami 1997, p. 464; also see Sueki 2004, p. 21.
there are two main forms to what is referred to as religious faith. 
One, which does not require an appeal to common sense, is belief 
beyond or outside anything rational, while the other is faith obtained 
through approval of an appeal to reason or common sense. In these 
two types of faith, the first cannot help but disappear through the 
advance of society and progress, while only the second can accom­
pany social progress. If we foolish scholars are unable to throw 
away our common sense and develop a faith outside of reason, how 
could more lettered men possibly do so.22
An Ideality of Origins?
Before taking these connections further, another important issue to ponder 
when considering Murakami’s work is the problem of what the philosopher 
Michel Foucault called the “ideality of origins” (itself a modernist version of 
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the genetic fallacy)—understood here as the notion that True Buddhism can 
only be found in the words and teachings of the “historical Buddha” Sakya­
muni. Such a belief characterizes much of Buddhist writing from ancient 
times up to and including the shin bukkyb scholars of the Meiji era; in fact, it 
is hard to find any Buddhist writer prior to the twentieth century who does 
not implicitly or explicitly make such a claim, and believe correspondingly 
that their own school’s teachings were the ones actually taught by Sakya­
muni himself (or, in the case of more belated traditions like Chan/Zen, if not 
actually taught then at least “thought” by Sakyamuni). As Tominaga shrewd­
ly noted, as far back as 250 years ago, the appeal to origins as a source for 
authority in Buddhism led to the wilful misattribution of Mahayana sutras to 
the time of the Buddha.23 Does Murakami fall for this originalist temptation, 
which, by modem standards of scholarship, is virtually impossible to 
defend?241 must confess that I cannot say for certain either way; on this issue, 
as with so many others, Murakami’s position is ambiguous. While he clear­
ly does believe that the core doctrines of Buddhism date back to the original 
teachings of Sakyamuni, he also allows that later doctrinal forms, of the 
Mahayana in particular, are “constructions.” At any rate, to give perhaps 
unwarranted credit, the very ambiguity of Murakami on this matter opens up 
the possibility that his work towards Buddhist reform and unification need 
not rely on what most would recognize today as a flawed and untenable 
premise.
23 Ironically, Tominaga himself, or at least the type of Daijo hibussetsuron that is implied 
by his writings, may also fall for the originalist trap, in the sense that the assertion that, based 
on historical evidence, the Mahayana sutras are belated texts with little connection to the his­
torical Buddha, betrays a reliance upon origins as the source for what is or is not a truly 
“Buddhist” text or teaching.
24 First, at least until someone comes up with a workable time machine, we simply cannot 
know, and will most likely never be able to know, what “Sakyamuni’s original teachings” 
really were. Even the texts that make up the Pali Canon date from at least several centuries 
after the Buddha’s death. Second, even without the various “postmodern” criticisms of such 
an approach, it might be argued that the very idea that Buddhism has or must have what amounts 
to an ahistorical, non-contingent, non-cultural “essence” or foundation of any sort, betrays a 
number of key Buddhist doctrines regarding conditionality and impermanence. This point, 
which has been elegantly argued by Dale Wright (1997), might even be used against Critical 
Buddhism.
Though an in-depth exploration of this matter would take us beyond the 
scope of the present paper, the point requires some further elaboration. Most 
of Murakami’s shin bukkyo peers, including Shaku Soen and Inoue Enryo, 
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dealt with the problem of Mahayana’s inescapable historical belatedness in a 
traditional way, by accepting the medieval Tendai teaching of the goji ETv or 
“Five Periods” of the Buddha’s teachings,25 whereby “not only were the 
Mahayana sutras indisputably the Buddha’s teachings, directly transmitted to 
the world by Saleyamuni, but they were his first teaching, his last teaching, 
and the only complete teaching of his Truth.”26 One way to understand this 
particular Mahayana “hermeneutic” is to contextualize the emergence of the 
Mahayana “schools” vis-a-vis the older, more traditional ones. Understand­
ing the truth of Buddha’s teachings as being beyond historical place and time 
fits well with Mahayana understandings of the power and abilities of Buddhas 
and Bodhisattvas, as well as the important trope of upaya-kausalya or expe­
dient means in teaching the Dharma.27 We can see hints of this approach in 
the following passage:
Sakyamuni Buddha was a human being; in fact, the only Buddha 
to have existed historically. While the Mahayana teachings are not 
the original teachings of the Buddha, they do reflect the intention
25 Though this particular Tendai version is thought to be based on a teaching from the 
Saddharmapundankasutra (Lotus Sutra), one can find very similar ideas in the Ta-ch’eng 
chi'i-hsin tun A SitUS lira (Awakening of Faith)—a text roundly criticized by Critical 
Buddhism as one of the founding documents of “topicalism”—as well as the work of Heian- 
period Shingon school founder Kukai, who produced his own “Ten Stages” of the progression 
of religious consciousness {juju shin “HiU), including not simply the main Buddhist schools 
but even, on the very bottom, Confucianism and Taoism. Kukai’s own “esoteric” Shingon 
school, it goes without saying, finds itself at the pinnacle of this supercessionist schema.
26 Snodgrass 1998, p. 328; see Inoue 1954, Ketelaar 1990. In 1895, Shaku Soen would 
declare, with unconcealed satisfaction, that “the mistaken idea that Mahayana Buddhism was 
not actually the Buddha’s teaching had been put to rest” (Snodgrass 1998, p. 329); and that, 
in fact, the specifically Japanese versions of Mahayana could be considered the core truth for 
the whole world, thus eclipsing the other great religions such as Christianity and Islam—doing, 
in effect, to the world religions what Mahayanists had long done to earlier Buddhist traditions 
—supercession in the name of both authenticity and “modernity.”
27 The locus classicus for this is, of course, the Saddharmapundankasutra itself. While the 
standard Mahayana apologetic asserts that the Saddharmapundankasutra was indeed taught 
by the historical Buddha, the very circumstances of that teaching on Vulture Peak are rife with 
mythological constructs and cosmic implications, such that the ordinary understanding of space 
and time is subverted (see Morgan 1998, pp. 226-7; Wang 2005, p. 350). In short, while the 
appeal to historical origins, in this case the Buddha’s vacana or “word of Buddha,” is still 
employed, at the same time it is subtly undercut by Mahayana understandings of time, space 
and the power of Buddhas to transcend these at will. As the Buddha himself (allegedly) put it, 
“I am always here” (T. 9: 43b).
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of the Buddha. The conflation of these ideas should not be surpris­
ing. It is natural for scientific research to conclude that Sakyamuni 
Buddha was a historical figure. To regard him as a transcendent 
being is pure foolishness.28
Almost hidden in this passage, couched within the more strident rejection of 
the notion of Sakyamuni as a supernatural being, one finds the significant 
addendum: the Mahayana still carries on the “intention of the Buddha” (Jbutsu- 
i IAS), regardless of the fact that its teachings do not come directly from his 
“golden mouth.”
Though some of Murakami’s remarks certainly indicate a Daijo hibussetsu- 
ron approach to denying the authenticity of the Mahayana, in general, Bukkyo
FIG. 15 Circulation of Relative
& Absolute
FIG. 16 Circulation of Objectivity
& Subjectivity
FIG. 17 Circulation of Discrimination
& Non-discrimination (Equality')
FIG. 18 Circulation of (World)
Renunciation & Non-renunciation
FIG. 19 Circulation of Real (’Thing’ )
& Ideal ( Principle’ )
Diagram 1. The Circulation of Buddhism from Abhidharma to the Pure Land Schools29
28 Murakami 1997, p. 7.
29 These figures are taken directly from Murakami 1997, pp. 392-99, with my translations. 
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toitsuron employs a more nuanced approach, one that is at once surprising and 
problematic, though not without a certain systematic elegance. Instead of see­
ing the belated Mahayana forms as more authentic elaborations of the original 
thoughts of the Buddha (as per Inoue), or as examples of degeneration from an 
original, pure set of teachings (as implied by Tominaga and, at times, by the 
Critical Buddhists), Murakami proposes rather a dynamic “circulation” of 
Buddhist doctrine. He represents this process schematically by way of a num­
ber of revolving circles, each of which is meant to indicate the flow between 
the poles of the most important themes found in the Mahayana teachings (see 
Diagram 1).
Examining these figures, it is hard to miss their decidedly Hegelian fla­
vor—thesis and antithesis working together to create a (higher?) synthesis or 
sublation (Gr. aufgehoberi) of differences. In this way, does Murakami sub­
sume the apparent contradictions and conflicts among sectarian visions of the 
Buddhism, from Abhidharma (Jp. [AJbidon [K]“>) and Sattyasiddhi (Jp. 
Jojitsu fi£^)30 through Yogacara (Jp. Hosso r£f@), Madhyamika (Jp. Sanron 
Him), Tendai, Kegon Six, Mikkyo (i.e., Shingon), Nichiren and Jodo $• 
± schools. Yet, for all the emphasis on sectarian harmony, it is important to 
note that if these figures are taken in a temporal sense, which is a plausible 
reading given the way that the various schools are located around the circle 
in Fig. 19, they “culminate” in the Jodo or Pure Land schools to which 
Murakami himself belonged. In other words, the various schools become lit­
tle more than preparatory experiments leading towards the ultimate end of 
Pure Land Buddhism. Moreover, given the Hegelian flavor of Murakami’s 
“circulation” figures, another question may be raised: Does Murakami’s 
vision of Buddhist unification require Hegel’s commitment to Absolute 
Reality “as the supersensible whole in which everything forms an integral and 
organic part?”31
30 An Indian school whose doctrines resemble in many ways those of the early Mahayana, 
e.g., sunya, established primarily on the teachings of the Satyasiddhi-sastra. See DDB.
31 Blocker and Starling 2001, p. 134. Blocker and Starling, along with Piovesana, cite Inoue 
Enryo as being the modem Japanese thinker most strongly influenced and committed to a 
Hegelian vision of Buddhism, the author of Bukkyd katsuron going so far as to suggest that 
“[t]he position of Buddhism, as manifested in Kegon-Tendai, does not differ in the slightest 
from that of Hegel [because] matter and mind both become the one reason, the Tathagata” 
(Piovesana 1963, p. 230).
In a way that suggests, once more, the stricter Daijo hibussetsuron of 
Tominaga, Murakami acknowledges that seminal Mahayana works such as 
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the Saddharmapundarikasutra and Hua-yen ching BhsIT are, in fact, belated 
developments rather than pure replications of the original teachings. How­
ever, he does not let this take away from their power or their ability to convey 
key Buddhist truths—in particular, the truth of Suchness or Absolute Reality, 
which Murakami refers to as the “Fourth Seal of the Dharma.” In fact, though 
he does not take this nearly so far in the supercessionist32 direction as do his 
peers Inoue and Soen, or Kukai and the Saddharmapundarikasutra did long 
before, Murakami does remark, almost in passing, that these belated works, 
based as they are on the standpoint of the Absolute (hontai no chiritsu
32 Perhaps a note is required on my use of this term, which in religious scholarship is gen­
erally used in the context of explaining the hermeneutical strategies of a fledging Christianity 
as it emerged and sought to clarify its position vis-a-vis its parent religion, Judaism. The even­
tual consensus—(achieved after much debate and disputation, and in the case of Marcion (c. 
110-160), even schism—was that the Christian “New Covenant,” though clearly historically 
belated with respect to the Jewish “Old Covenant,” effectively supersedes the latter, without 
(the theory goes) erasing or denying its validity (in a sense similar to the term “sublation”). 
Obviously, the subtleties in such an understanding were frequently lost on Christian leaders 
and layfolk alike, thus providing a main source for centuries of Christian anti-semitism. Though 
the parallel with the rise of the Mahayana is not perfect, I believe that there are enough simi­
larities to justify its application here.
33 Murakami 1997, p. 231.
are able to convey their message on the problems of human life and the 
cosmos more clearly, and without the “roughness” that one finds in the ear­
lier, “Hinayana” writings, which are based on the presumably inferior stand­
point of the phenomenal world (genshokai no chiritsu ±tilif).33
Perhaps even more important is the shape that Murakami introduces in this 
discussion—the large, all-encompassing sphere, around which the various 
schools hover between two poles at opposite ends. Essentially, Murakami 
wants to show that, while each school takes a distinct and sometimes unique 
path, which is most evident in the external forms of its practice (including rit­
ual, but also variations in doctrine), they ultimately share a common source, 
home and foundation in the core teachings of no-self and Nirvana (which, as 
he argues elsewhere, themselves arise from the more basic teachings of the 
Four Noble Truths, Eightfold Path, and the doctrine of equiprimordiality). It 
is thus at the level of fundamental doctrine that the unity of Buddhism lies. 
As with the “developed” Mahayana teachings about Buddha-nature and orig­
inal enlightenment, the unity of Buddhism according to Murakami is in fact 
already real, but only needs to be realized by Buddhists of his day—at the 
“ideal” if not the “formal” level.
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Against this somewhat rosy scenario, Critical Buddhists, Matsumoto and 
Hakamaya, see the same history as one that is rife with stasis, conflict, and 
degeneration—the only bright spots being the rearguard efforts of heroes like 
Soto school founder Dogen to stem the tide flowing away from True (i.e., 
“critical”) Buddhism. Critical Buddhism would point out that, while 
Murakami may be right about the importance of strict adherence to the basic 
doctrines underlying True Buddhism, he is far too tolerant in allowing for all 
the “84,000” schools to have a home within the all-enveloping Buddhist 
sphere, without discrimination on the basis of their specific teachings or prac­
tices. Yet, the issue is further complicated by the fact that, as we have seen 
above, Murakami’s Hegelian spheres are not quite so all-encompassing as 
they may at first appear, given the element of historical progression away from 
the pure source and back to what appears to be the highest development in 
the Pure Land teachings. Thus, from a Critical Buddhist perspective, 
Murakami ends up with the worst of both worlds, combing an ideology of 
harmony and non-discrimination with a covert supersessionism, based less 
on solid rational argument or historical scholarship than on a combination of 
sectarian affiliation and wishful thinking.34
34 Moreover, though this falls outside the scope of Critical Buddhism, we might also add 
that Murakami is being paternalistic in effectively undercutting or stripping away the “exter­
nal forms” of the Buddhist rainbow in favor of a denuded, underlying essence. When he says, 
of his own school, Jodo Shinshu or True Pure Land Buddhism, that its beliefs in salvation via 
Amida’s Western paradise are simply a cover for the ancient teachings about Nirvana, it is hard 
not to feel that perhaps more is lost than gained in such a conclusion.
Variations of Historicism
Perhaps one way to understand these important differences in the work of 
Murakami and the Critical Buddhists is to see them as employing different 
types of historicism. Above, I applied this term to the work of Tominaga, who 
quite clearly pursued a path of scholarship based on the principle that the truth 
of Buddhism can be found only through historical investigation. Thus 
Tominaga (who, it should be recalled, wrote his works before Hegel) would 
have had little problem accepting the Hegelian dictum that “Philosophy is the 
history of philosophy.” Hegel also, however, argued that, as such, there can 
be no objective way to determine which of the many competing historical the­
ories (or doctrines) are true—thus opening the door to what would eventually 
be called “relativism.” This version of historicism, embraced by many so- 
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called “postmodern” thinkers, is sometimes called today “New Historicism,” 
since it actually goes further than the earlier version of Hegel, who combined 
his historicist leanings with a conviction in the inexorable progressive work­
ings of History through the Absolute Spirit.35 Though the vocabulary is obvi­
ously quite different, Murakami’s dual commitment to historical research on 
the one hand and his conviction of the underlying (and eventual?) unification 
of Buddhist schools through a type of circulatory dialectic, on the other, belies 
a commitment to a historicism remarkably akin to that of Hegel. In contrast, 
Tominaga appears to embrace a version of historicism that flirts with origi- 
nalism: the truths of Buddhism can be discovered not in the progressive 
unfolding of Buddhist doctrines through dialectical interplay but rather 
through the uncovering of the original teachings of the Buddha.
35 This more strictly Hegelian historicism—picked up and reworked on a materialist basis 
by Marx—is roundly criticized in the works of Karl Popper, notably his Poverty of Historicism 
(1944) and The Open Society and its Enemies (1945). In a fashion similar to Critical Buddhism, 
Popper argued that this Hegelian view is the main theoretical presupposition underpinning 
many forms of political authoritarianism and tyranny.
Along with the application of “discriminating wisdom” to all phenomena, 
history also plays an important role in Critical Buddhism, since a clear knowl­
edge of the history of Buddhist doctrines in relation to Buddhist ethics and 
politics helps us to understand and take measures to avoid repeating the mis­
takes of the past. Here, Critical Buddhism would laud Murakami’s own com­
mitment to history and historical research, but also his recognition, which one 
can find in the early work of the journal Bukkyo shirin that the
“facts” of history alone, shriven of doctrine or faith, cannot take us much fur­
ther along the path of reform and reconstruction. Moreover, despite superfi­
cial resemblances, both Murakami and the Critical Buddhists ultimately part 
company with common modernist assumptions regarding the pure origins of 
Buddhism before the Mahayana; even while retaining its strong criticism of 
the Mahayana streams, Matsumoto and Hakamaya do not argue that the only 
true Buddhism is original Buddhism, but rather that the only true Buddhism 
is critical Buddhism, which means something entirely different. It must be 
admitted, as Sueki Fumihiko has pointed out in his recent essay, that 
Murakami was rather inconsistent in his attitudes to the relative importance 
between history and doctrine, as well as the status of Mahayana within the 
larger Buddhist tradition (Sueki 2004). However, although Murakami’s com­
mitment to history appears to have weakened over the decades, it never entire­
ly disappears, and serves to keep him apart from the growing trend towards 
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the non-historical, existential brand of modernist Buddhism, developed in the 
early and mid-twentieth century by the likes of D. T. Suzuki, the Kyoto 
School, and sundry Western Buddhist popularizers.
“Daijd bukkyo ”
Some of these same themes, as well as what might be seen as Murakami’s 
growing ambivalence towards Daijd hibussetsuron, emerge even more 
strongly in a late article entitled “Daijo bukkyb” A1SIA® (Mahayana 
Buddhism), where he says: “My contention is, the Buddha did not necessar­
ily teach the Hinayana or the Mahayana, as these are designations invented 
later; what was really preached by the Buddha himself was primitive 
Buddhism in which there was yet no differentiation.”36 Yet, Murakami fol­
lows this by allowing that some forms of early Buddhism do come close to 
the original teachings—particularly those reliant on the Agamas, as well as 
the tradition known as Sarvastivada, an early Indian school well known for 
its insistence on the reality of dharmas past, present, and future, and thus of 
the phenomenal world—doctrines that would come to be heavily criticized 
by Nagarjuna, Asanga and the emerging Mahayana schools.37
36 Murakami 1921, p. 95.
37 Upon reflection, in many respects the Sarvastivadins are the closest ancient sect or school 
to modem Critical Buddhism. First, they are a scholarly movement, one committed to a form 
of realism, but not to the extent of development what we might call a deep essentialism: the 
non-reality of the forms we interact with are no less significant or useful for being “non-real,” 
and even the fully-existent dharmas of which all things are composed do not appear to rest on 
an overarching foundation or Reality (see Williams 2000, pp. 112-5). Given this, it is ironic, 
from a CB perspective that it was the Mahayana tradition, with its development of tathagata- 
garbha, Suchness, Buddha-nature, and original enlightenment, that seems to have relapsed into 
the very ways of thinking that they originally fought so hard against.
38 Murakami 1921, pp. 97-98.
However, as Murakami puts it, the Sarvastivadins “were satisfied with a 
logical, intellectual, and moral explanation of life, they took the world as it 
appears to the senses, they neglected to pay attention to the deepest yearnings 
of the soul, in fact they regarded these as not concerning our ethical and log­
ical life. It was these assumptions . . . that Nagarjuna fiercely attacked. . . ”38 
On the one hand, we might expect Murakami to praise the Sarvastivadins, not 
only for their adherence to the early Buddhist teachings, but also for their 
attention to rational analysis and the ideal of “discriminating wisdom”— 
which aligns well with Murakami’s early commitment to rationalism and 
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critical, historical studies. Yet, on the other hand, it is impossible to read the 
remark that the Sarvastivadins dismissed the “deepest yearnings of the soul” 
without hearing a strong note of approbation. In fact, Murakami goes on in 
“Daijo bukkyo” to develop the thesis that Nagarjuna helped establish a more 
authentic expression of Buddhist teaching by adding a fourth “Seal” to the 
Hinayana’s “Three Seals of the Dharma.” This “Fourth Seal” is Suchness or 
Absolute Reality (Jp. shinnyo). As in Bukkyo tditsuron, but in much more suc­
cinct and cursory fashion, Murakami outlines a genealogy of the development 
of Mahayana after the rise of Sarvastivada: from Nagarjuna, Asariga, and the 
Tci-ch ’eng chi ’i-hsin lun, through Asvagosa, to the Chinese schools—divid­
ed, somewhat awkwardly, into four categories: “Perfect Doctrine” (i.e., 
T’ien-t’ai/Tendai, Kegon); “Extra-Scriptural” (i.e., Chan/Zen); “Esoteric” 
(i.e., Shingon); and finally the Pure Land schools. Though the tone of this 
short essay on “Daijo bukkyo” is largely descriptive (as, it might be argued, 
are most of Murakami’s writings), the brief conclusion betrays the fact that 
there is more at work here than a mere attempt to lay out the objective facts 
of history. Here is how Murakami concludes the piece:
The Idea of Amitabha Buddha taught by the Jodo school seems at 
first sight to contradict all the dogmas of Buddhism, but we know 
that it is the moral and religious culmination of the Mahayana 
Buddhology which unfolded itself after the passing of the Buddha 
in conjunction with the development of Suchness (shinnyo) as the 
ultimate reality of existence.39
39 Ibid., p. 108. Emphasis added.
We might spend many pages parsing these rather striking lines, but let us focus 
on just two points. First, Murakami here openly plays the Mahayana super- 
cessionist card—the theory or perhaps ideology by which each successive 
school of Buddhist tradition replaces and in fact supersedes, in turn, each ear­
lier one. Not only is the Mahayana thus lauded as a gradual but persistent 
“unfolding” of Buddhist truth (in contrast to Daijo hibussetsuron, Critical 
Buddhism, and even some of Murakami’s earlier statements), but now the 
very school that, by the author’s own admission, seems to diverge most widely 
from the early Buddhist path, is in fact the one that is lauded as the “culmi­
nation” of such a long and arduous development.
Second, and more pertinent to the concerns of Critical Buddhism, 
Murakami here connects the “obvious” superiority of the Pure Land Way with 
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the development of the so-called Fourth Seal of the Dharma—Absolute 
Reality, Suchness or dharmadhatu—which came to be considered in the 
Mahayana as the essential ground or locus of equiprimordiality and thus of 
all phenomena.40 Moreover, such a doctrine cannot, says Murakami, possi­
bly be explained or understood on a logical, rational basis—“it is beyond our 
analytical understanding.”41 This line of thought, and the mode of express­
ing it, could hardly be more opposed to Critical Buddhism, which argues that 
it is in fact the very development of essentialist doctrines like Suchness— 
whether found in earlier Mahayana tathagatha-garbha and Buddha-nature or 
the later and more specifically Japanese notion of “original enlightenment”— 
that has most corrupted the true spirit of Buddhism, and that this has led to a 
“mystical” and problematic notion that Buddhist truth is somehow beyond 
language and reason. Furthermore, Murakami here makes the claim, though 
without providing anything in the way of supporting evidence or argument, 
that this gradual progress of the Mahayana, by way of the doctrine of Suchness 
to the Pure Land schools, is one that is not only religious but also moral. Here 
too, the contrast with Critical Buddhism could hardly be sharper, since both 
Hakamaya and Matsumoto insist that it is precisely within the realm of ethics 
(and politics) that Suchness wreaks havoc upon modem forms of Mahayana.
40 Cf. DDB entries on hokkai engi “The dharmadhatu as the environmental cause
of all phenomena, everything being dependent on everything else, therefore one is in all and 
all in one;” nyoraizo engi TteX&A and shinnyo engi MMfetL “Production from tathata 
(shinnyo) through the action of causation.” Such doctrines have their locus classicus in the Ta­
ch 'eng chi ’i-hsin lun, but find opposition in the writings of Faxiang and the alayavijhana doc­
trine of the Hosso school.
41 Murakami 1921, p. 99. Besides suggesting an even stronger move away from Kant to 
Hegel, we might also suggest that in focusing here on the foundation of dharmadhatu, 
Murakami has moved away from the late nineteenth-century “science of religion” or Religions- 
wisserschaft and closer to the so-called “phenomenology of religion” found in the early twen­
tieth-century works of Rudolf Otto and Mircea Eliade, a path that, in its insistence on a 
common, non-rational “ground” to religion, corresponds in many ways with the work of D. T. 
Suzuki, Hatano Seiichi, and the Kyoto School (see Tsuchiya 2000, p. 17). Yet, here again, in 
the case of Otto, Eliade, Suzuki, et al., the non-verbal ground was located in a kind of imme­
diate experience—a line of argument suggested but not fully developed in Murakami.
Below are two contrasting figures introduced by Matsumoto, showing the 
structure of what he derisively calls either dhatuvada (a Sanskrit neologism 
meaning something like “the way of essentialism”) or Topical Buddhism 
(Diagram 2), and the reverse image of what Matsumoto takes to be “True” 
Buddhism (Diagram 3):
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= super-locus (S fe)
Diagram 2. Matsumoto’s Map of the “Theory of Locus” or Dhatuvada Buddhism42
dharma | dharma | dharma
dharmadhatu
Diagram 3. Matsumoto’s Map of Pratitya-samutpada Buddhism42 3
42 Adapted from Matsumoto 1989, p. 5, as well as a slightly revised version in Matsumoto 
1997, p. 170.
43 Adapted from Matsumoto 1989, p. 67.
In Diagram 2, the components of phenomenal reality, or dharmas, arise from 
a fundamental locus or ground, signified by terms such as dharmadhatu and 
ekayana. This, says Matsumoto, though common, is a “non-Buddhist” 
deviation from the proper understanding of Buddhism based on pratitya- 
samutpada, as portrayed in Diagram 3. Although the fit is not immediately 
obvious, the so-called dhatuvada structure for the arisal of phenomenal real­
ity out of an underlying locus does in fact point to the heart of Murakami’s 
own circulation thesis. In both cases, the individual elements—whether dhar­
mas or the variety of sectarian teachings—become epiphenomena whose 
deeper reality must be sought in a singular, unified base. Though Murakami, 
as we have seen, adds a Hegelian dynamism to the picture, which lessens the 
sense of stasis, the framework remains, for all intents and purposes, a ‘topi­
cal’ one. As Matsumoto writes:
The structure of dhatuvada, whose affirmation of identity and non­
discrimination ironically ends up affirming and absolutizing actual 
differences, can also be seen in the Japanese notion of “original 
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enlightenment,” itself based on the tathagata-garbha tradition . . . 
The same phenomenon took place in India. The structure of dhatu- 
vada . . . had itself been the target of Shakyamuni’s criticism—the 
Brahman-atman of the Upanishads . . . The important point is that 
Shakyamuni’s doctrine of causality, pratltya-samutpada, can only 
be understood when viewed as antithetical to the theory of a sin­
gular ground or cause of the manifold world—that is, to the idea of 
dhatuvada . . . This is also the grounds for my thesis that tathagata- 
garbha thought is not Buddhist.44
44 Matsumoto 1997, p. 172.
45 See, e.g., Victoria 1997, Victoria 2003, Faure 1991, Faure 2002, Ives 1999, Ives 2001, 
Ives 2005, Sharf 1993, Heisig and Maraldo 1994. A Japanese precedent can be found in the 
postwar writings of Ichikawa Hakugen, particularly Ichikawa 1970.
46 There are certainly conservative and even nationalist currents in Murakami’s thought and
writings (just as there are, more obviously, in the work of Inoue Enryo)—the best example 
being his 1912 essay entitled “Loyalty [to the Emperor] and Filial Piety in Buddhism,” pub­
lished, along with pieces by both Inoues (Enryo and Tetsujiro) in a work entitled Sonno aikoku 
ron (Essays on Reverence for the Emperor and Patriotism).
Now, it might be argued that neither side actually goes far towards proving 
its case in this debate—one of the weakest links in Critical Buddhism is 
precisely the assumption that quasi-essentialist doctrines have a direct and 
deleterious effect on the ethical behavior of Buddhists. Yet, Matsumoto and 
Hakamaya do have one thing on their side: the benefit of hindsight. Though 
it may be impossible to prove their point, the suggestion that Buddhist doc­
trines may have played a shaping, if not a determinative role in the otherwise­
surprising complicity of virtually all mainstream Japanese Buddhist schools 
in the development of imperial ideology of early Showa until the end of World 
War II cannot be so easily dismissed. It remains a compelling hypothesis, one 
that I believe is bolstered by the recent work of scholars like Brian Victoria, 
Bernard Faure, Christopher Ives and Robert Sharf.45 This is not to suggest 
that Murakami, or his peers, should be held culpable for the emergence of 
what would later be called by the seemingly paradoxical term, Imperial Way 
Buddhism (Kodozen i>jll¥).46 Yet, the case can and perhaps needs to be made 
that some of Murakami’s ideas, especially in his later writings, such as those 
proposing the development of “Suchness” as the basis for the “obvious” supe­
riority of Mahayana or more specifically Pure Land buddhology and moral­
ity, and the criticism—if such it be—of Abhidharma and the Sarvastivadins 
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in particular for sacrificing “the soul’s deepest yearnings” on the altar of logic 
and intellection, appear to coalesce in a number of respects with the highly 
destructive Buddhist ideologies of the 1920s, ’30s and ’40s.
Moving straight to the heart of the matter, from a Critical Buddhist per­
spective the biggest stumbling-block to retrieving Murakami’s work today is 
the very thing that may at first seem to be its greatest appeal—the notion of 
Buddhist unification. This is a matter that goes beyond the simple accusation 
that Murakami or his writings—like those of most of his peers—supported or 
endorsed in some way the emerging nationalist ideology and loyalty of 
religious institutions to the imperial household. While the desire to bring 
together a fractured tradition seems laudable in its aspirations to “tolerance,” 
particularly within religious traditions that have fought sectarian battles (i.e., 
all of them), a strong counter-argument suggests that, in our present, “post­
modern” age, such unification can only be built upon a shared appreciation 
for diversity, not upon the imposition of some deeper, underlying similarity. 
Of course, there are similarities and shared doctrinal grounds among the var­
ious streams of Buddhism, but to suggest that only what is shared is relevant 
or truly Buddhist seems to be drifting into dangerous ideological waters, not 
to mention the supersessionist tendencies in the specific version of histori­
cism employed by Murakami. After all, the rhetoric of harmony—based on 
a romanticist organic model in which, despite “superficial” distinctions, a 
people or Volk share a deep, fundamental common accord—has been used in 
modem times as one of the foundations of modem fascism, in Japan as in 
Germany and Italy.47
47 Besides the obvious example of the kokutai BIIA or “one body of the nation” led by the 
divine emperor, one might include the almost risibly euphemistic “Greater East Asia Co­
Prosperity Sphere” (Dai tda kyoei ken AMS’AMIS)—based on the notion that, in creating 
their empire, the Japanese armies were simply “reminding” other Asian nations of their unity 
vis-a-vis the encroaching Western nations. Here, real, important differences—including resis­
tance to brutal Japanese occupation—disappear from view in favor of an (imposed) ideology 
of peace and brotherhood. The Buddhist element here can be found in the fact that some 
Japanese Buddhist leaders were in fact supporting imperial expansion in the name of “remind­
ing” Asian Buddhists of their true, common heritage (which, alas, they had lost); see Victoria 
1997, passim.
Consider the following provisional chart, presented here as a possible 
Critical Buddhist approach to the problems of unification and non-sectarian 
Buddhist scholarship.
Here, Buddhism remains “founded” on a core set of doctrines such as
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Diagram 4. Proposed Methodology for Non-sectarian Buddhist Scholarship
1 <<— (non-sectarian) scholarship |
| doctrine doctrine ► | doctrine
doctrine —► doctrine —► | doctrine
f
► history / ideology —►
pratitya-samutpada and anatman. Yet, these are not taken to be part of a 
larger, deeper or more fundamental ground in “Suchness” or “Absolute 
Reality.” Rather, the basic doctrines give rise to new doctrines, through the 
principle of causality: like all dharmas, doctrines arise historically in an inter­
dependent fashion. This chart recognises that the principle of equiprimor- 
diality is more than just a doctrine or point of faith, but a method that must 
be applied wholesale to reflection on Buddhist tradition and study of the emer­
gence and development of sectarian differences. Here is a point which 
Murakami may have something to add to Critical Buddhism, since, for all his 
attempts at unification, he is clearly more willing to appreciate the contin­
gency of sectarian teachings, without dismissing them out of hand if they fail 
to conform to certain standards of rationality. The movement of the various 
parts here indicates that the model for discussion and debate is more akin to 
Socratic than Hegelian dialectics. Yet, what Murakami’s vision lacks, due 
partly to his historical circumstances but also to his emphasis on unification, 
is a deep recognition of the political and ideological elements involved in the 
development of Buddhist doctrine. A truly critical, non-sectarian scholarship 
must come to terms with the complications introduced by ideology in doctri­
nal history.
Murakami’s Legacy: (Critical) Buddhist Theology?
After the above cautionary remarks regarding the pitfalls of placing too much 
value on unification, I would like to conclude with a more positive evaluation 
of Murakami’s work, framed by the question of whether Murakami—this 
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early if inconsistent champion of historical scholarship and non-sectarian- 
ism—might be considered a practitioner of something that has of late come 
to be known as “Buddhist theology.” According to Roger Jackson and John 
Makransky, whereas, by and large:
scholars trained in Religious Studies (including Buddhist Studies) 
critically analyze the data of a religion at a distance from tradition, 
to develop theories of interest to the Western academy. By contrast, 
contemporary theologians who have been trained by and stand 
within a religious tradition use the same tools for a different purpose: 
to draw critically upon the resources of tradition to help it commu­
nicate in a new and authentic voice to the contemporary world.48
48 Makransky 2000, p. ix; see also Makransky 2000, p. 19 for a similar but more extended 
explanation of “Buddhist theology.”
49 See p. 108 of this issue.
50 See Hakamaya 1997.
51 Matsumoto 2000, pp. 1-12. Steven Heine (2001) discusses the “transition” in a more
recent work of Matsumoto, away from Critical Buddhism towards what Matsumoto himself 
refers to as “Critical Theology” (hihan shiigaku but I am more inclined to see a
development in a more specific “theological” direction, rather than a turn away from “criti­
cism” towards “theology”—since I would lump Critical Buddhism itself within a broad the­
ological framework.
As I have argued elsewhere,49 both Matsumoto and Hakamaya can fall 
within this category, based on the fact that, despite their affection for Des­
cartes and sometimes positivist rhetoric, they make no secret of the fact that 
the aim of their work is less to discover the objective Truth of Buddhism (they 
deride the particularly Weberian method of objectivity that undergirds much 
modem scholarship),50 than to promote a particular “Buddhistic” agenda, 
although one that, in their view, aligns very well with the values and aims of 
the European Enlightenment. In other words, Critical Buddhism has the 
explicit purpose of criticizing, reinteipreting, developing, and ultimately 
advocating a “superior” form of the Buddhist religion. The goal is not the 
uncovering of truth or to make a “contribution to knowledge” or to “the acad­
emy,” but to get Japanese Buddhists to realize the errors of their ways. Indeed, 
of late, Matsumoto has moved away from the term Critical Buddhism and 
begun to proclaim his recent work an exercise in “Critical Theology.”51
How does Murakami’s work relate to this emerging area of Buddhist the­
ology? First, it should be recalled that the term shukyd usually translated 
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today as “religion,” actually means something more like “sectarian teach­
ings.” Until the Meiji period and the influx of Western scholarly methods, 
Buddhist “scholarship” in Japan (with the exception of rare thinkers like 
Tominaga) was largely sectarian studies. Murakami, along with others in­
volved in the development of “academic Buddhism” (kodan bukkydgaku It 
introduced a scholarly approach quite distinct from the work of 
more traditional Buddhist sectarian writers. Yet, Murakami does not follow 
the path towards a pure “religious studies” or Religionswissenschaft ap­
proach. Like the Critical Buddhists, he is clearly interested in promoting a 
“Buddhistic” agenda.52 Bukkyo toitsuron is not meant to be simply a com­
prehensive genealogy of the Mahayana, but, more importantly, a call to action 
in the name of greater Buddhist harmony. Though ponderous in style, it is a 
work that remains every bit as much a manifesto as Hakamaya’s Hihan bukkyo 
or Matsumoto’s Engi to ku. Moreover, for all its weakness when judged by 
contemporary standards of historical scholarship, it remains of interest as a 
work that strives to forge a difficult balance between objectivity and polemic, 
at a time when most Buddhist scholars were lining up firmly on either side of 
the divide.
52 As early as the foundation of Bukkyo shirin, his journal dedicated to historical Buddhist 
research, Murakami was attempting to trace a “middle path” between the so-called “scien­
tific” historians on the one hand, and the “moralists” on the other, by following a Buddhistic 
(bukkyd shugi) perspective (Bukkyo shirin 1, no. 2, p. 1). Sueki calls this “a particular charac­
teristic of. . . Murakami’s historical perspective on Buddhism” (Sueki 2004, p. 94).
53 David Tracy has defined theology in this sense as “intellectual reflection within a reli­
gious tradition”—but reflection that falls somewhere between the lines of apologetics and his­
torical studies (Jackson and Makransky 2000, p. 2). Heine (2000, p. 133) notes that the Japanese 
term shiigaku A'Y—though literally translated as “sectarian studies”—actually contains 
Tracy’s sense.
The benefits of “Buddhist theology” are many, but in particular the frank 
admission of Buddhist affiliation, and the corollary belief that scholarly work 
may have a goal that goes beyond the search for empirical facts or some 
“objective” truth, combined with a commitment to intellectual honesty and a 
desire to test whatever is testable (without dismissing as unimportant that 
which is not), provides a potentially fertile “middle way” between the more 
strict terms of so-called “objective” scholarship (whose methodology has 
recently taken a number of hits from feminist, “postmodern” and “postcolo­
nial” scholars) and simple sectarian apologetics.53 A final problem that besets 
much modem Japanese Buddhist scholarship is the tendency to focus on ideas 
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over practice—a trend that, according to Nishijima Gudo, was actually rein­
forced by Western influence during the period of shin bukkyd.54 This is a prob­
lem that should draw our attention away from Buddhist theology and towards 
Engaged Buddhism, an applied form of Buddhist studies now flourishing in 
the West and in various, mostly Theravada, Buddhist countries. Though Cri­
tical Buddhism also outlined a vision of Buddhism that is at once ethically 
and politically engaged, with perhaps one exception,55 neither Hakamaya nor 
Matsumoto went very far towards introducing or implementing practical 
reforms themselves—their work remained largely enclosed within the ivory 
tower of ideas.56 Yet, it is precisely the emphasis on the relevance of doctrine 
and fundamental beliefs to Buddhist ethics and socio-political engagement 
that remains the most important legacy of Critical Buddhism, and one that 
must be retained in any contemporary movement towards Buddhist reform, 
let alone Buddhist unification.
54 Nishijima 1997, pp. 19-20.
55 The one exception being their work towards ending social discrimination towards the 
burakumin or “outcastes” of Japan (see Bodiford 1996).
56 Stone (1999, p. 183) provides the most concise argument against this weakness of Critical 
Buddhism, though she is not alone in making note of it. One may even get a sense of this in 
the fact of the “idealization” of the aristocratic philosopher Dogen, whose ideas and life, as 
Heine (2001, p. 136) notes, appear to be much less “conducive to social reforms” than any of 
the other Kamakura Buddhist reformers, who tend to be ignored by Critical Buddhism. This 
also, of course, raises the question of their own sectarian biases.
57 Murakami 1997, p. 53.
Conclusion
In his magnum opus, Bukkyd toitsuron, Murakami attempts to employ the 
tools of modem scholarship to discern a clear historical and doctrinal foun­
dation for Buddhism. In discussing more specifically these foundations of 
Buddhism, Murakami comes up with three general principles, all of which 
seem to coalesce well with the Critical Buddhism of Matsumoto Shiro and 
Hakamaya Noriaki: (1) the priority of reason over revelation; (2) the priority 
of subjectivity over objectivity; and (3) the ultimate goal of liberation from 
ignorance.57 Yet, unlike the Critical Buddhists, Murakami also called for the 
emergence of a universal, non-sectarian Buddhism based on a set of unified 
and undisputed doctrines. In other words, Murakami’s vision was more con­
structive than critical—or, at least, was intended to be both. As a result, he 
was not completely dismissive of the Mahayana teachings, coming to see 
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these as belated but nonetheless significant adaptations and pennutations of 
the core Buddhist truths taught by Sakyamuni. A tension thus arises in his 
work between the call for a historical approach and the desire to bring about 
or “realize” an already existing doctrinal unity among Buddhist schools. 
While Murakami’s usage of what amounts to a Hegelian version of histori­
cism can be criticized on a number of levels, his commitment to critical schol­
arship, engaged in a constructive “Buddhist theology,” makes his work, for 
all its flaws, worthy of reconsideration.
ABBREVIATION
DDB Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, edited by Charles Muller, 
<http://www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb/index.html> (12 June 2006).
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